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INTRODUCTION
The law of armed force is typically categorized in two bodies of
law, jus ad bellum (the law on recourse to force) andjus in bello (the
law governing the conduct of hostilities).' Historically, however,
* Dr. jur., LL.M. (NYU), LL.M. (K6In-Paris), Reader in Public International
Law and International Criminal Justice, Swansea University,
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there has been an additional parameter in the equation, namely the
concept of jus post bellum (law after war). This concept has
remained at the periphery of legal scholarship,2 although it has a
traditional place in the context of just war theory.3
http://www.swan.ac.uk/ staff/academic/Law/stahnc/; Legal Officer, International
Criminal Court. This Essay is based on a paper presented at the joint seminar of the
Grotius Centre of International Legal Studies and the Amsterdam Center for
International Law, in co-operation with the Hague Institute for the
Internationalisation of Law and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Leiden University, February 2-3, 2007. It is part of my broader research project on
jus post bellum.
1. The terms emerged in legal writing in the 1920s. Giuliano Enriques used
the term jus ad bellum in 1928. See G. Enriques, Considerazioni sulla Teoria della
Guerra nel Diritto Internazionale [Considerations on the Theory of War in
International Law], 7 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 172 (1928).
2. International lawyers have made some contributions. See, e.g., Kristen
Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the
Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 289-95
(2005) (providing an overview ofjus post bellum, and discussing why the concept
is distinct from jus ad bellum andjus in bello); Carsten Stahn, 'Jus ad bellum ', 'Jus
in Bello'. . . 'Jus Post Bellum? '-Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed
Force, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 921, 941-42 (2006) (proposing that a "tripartite
conception of the law of armed force" would rectify inadequacies found in the
classical dualist conception); Daniel Thdirer & Malcolm MacLaren, 'lus Post
Bellum" in Iraq: A Challenge to the Applicability and Relevance of International
Humanitarian Law?, in WELTINNENRECHT: LIBER AMICORUM JOST DELBROCK
[GLOBAL INTERNAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOST DELBROCK], 753, 776-79
(Klaus Dicke et al. eds., 2005) (examining the post-war occupation of Iraq in the
context of International Humanitarian Law and using the Iraqi situation to
exemplify possible challenges to thejus post bello doctrine).
3. See generally BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 160-62 (2006)
[hereinafter OREND, MORALITY OF WAR] (labeling jus post bellum as "justice after
war," and asserting that "violations ofjus post bellum are just as serious as those of
jus ad bellum and jus in bello"); BRIAN OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 57 (2000) [hereinafter OREND, WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE] (explaining that Immanuel Kant created the concept of
jus post bellum to "consider in detail the justice of the move from war back to
peace"); Andrew Rigby, Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Jus Post Bellum, in
JUST WAR THEORY: A REAPPRAISAL 177 (Mark Evans ed., 2005); Gary J. Bass,
Jus Post Bellum, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 384 (2004) (discussing the importance of
just post bellum in creating a complete just war theory); Richard P. DiMeglio, The
Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV.
116 (2005); Louis V. lasiello, The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War, 57
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 33 (2003) (proffering that the difficulty of achieving post
bellum conflicts demonstrates the need to update and revise just war theory); Brian
Orend, Jus Post Bellum, 31 J. Soc. PHIL. 117, 118 (2000) (reviewing the concept
ofjus post bellum, and placing it in the framework of just war theory); Robert E.
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Traces of a tripartite conception may be found in different
traditions of thought. St. Augustine linked war to the post-war goal
of peace in his book City of God which became one of the most
respected and frequently-cited books of Church history.4 This
thinking was refined by proponents of the just war theory, such as
Francisco de Vitoria, the founder of the School of Salamanca, and
scholastic Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Sudrez
(1621).' These scholars made a compelling argument: If a war has a
just cause, and is fought justly, it must also lead to a just post-war
settlement.6
Hugo Grotius developed a more refined account of this approach
in On the Law of War and Peace, which secularized just war theory
on the basis of principles of natural law which were held to be
binding on all people and nations regardless of local custom.7 Book
III of On the Law of War and Peace includes not only rules
governing the conduct of war, but practical principles on just war
termination, such as rules on surrender, good faith, and interpretation
Williams, Jr. & Dan Caldwell, Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the
Principles of Just Peace, 7 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 309 (2006) (asserting that
inadequate attention has been paid to considerations of just post bellum despite the
fact that the moral judgments made following a war are just as important as those
made during a war).
4. See ST. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST PAGANS 866
(Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin Books 1984) (1467) (insisting that "peace is the
instinctive aim of all creatures, and is even the ultimate purpose of war").
5. FRANCISCO SUAREZ, DE TRPLICI VIRTUTE THEOLOGICA, FIDE, SPE, ET
CHARITATE [THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES] (1621), translated in 20 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (James Brown Scott ed., Gwladys L.
Williams et al. trans., 1944); FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI
RELECTIONES (1696), translated in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
(James Brown Scott & Ernest Nys eds., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917).
6. See SUAREz, supra note 5, at 838-40 (advocating the broad view that a
sovereign has no reason to continue hostilities where "full and sufficient
satisfaction is voluntarily offered" by the opposing sovereign); DE VICTORIA, supra
note 5, at 185-87 (providing basic rules for the just seizure of a conquered enemy's
property and payment of tribute).
7. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF
WAR AND PEACE: THREE BOOKS] (1625), translated in 3 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 52 (James B. Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Carnegie
Institution of Washington 1925) (1913) (claiming that the first principles of nature
favor war, as the "end and aim of war" is "the preservation of life and limb, and
the keeping or acquiring of things useful to life").
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of peace treaties.' This conception was later taken up in the
eighteenth century in the natural law-based works on the law of
nations by Christian von Wolff and Emer de Vattel. 9
Immanuel Kant completed the tripdichon and distinguished three
categories: Right to War (Recht zum Krieg), Right in War (Recht im
Krieg), and Right after War (Recht nach dem Krieg)."° Kant
associated the "law after war" with substantive principles of justice,
such as the fairness of peace settlements, respect of the sovereignty
of the vanquished state, and limits on the punishment of people (for
example, through excessive reparation). " Some of these principles
foreshadow traces of modern peacemaking.
Surprisingly, this "third leg" in the theory of warfare disappeared
in the conceptualization of the laws of war in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. 2 Thus, jus in bello was codified, then jus ad
bellum. 3 In contrast, jus post bellum did not receive much attention.
Treatises at the beginning of the twentieth century treated the
concept in a cursory fashion, if at all.'4
This finding begs some questions about the structure of
international law and legal scholarship in the twentieth century. How
did this discrepancy between just war theory and the theorization of
the law of armed force emerge? Why was the absence of jus post
bellum not perceived as a gap in the structure of international law?
8. Id. at 804-3 1.
9. See E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi
NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES
SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS]
(1758), translated in 3 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 14 (James B.
Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916)
(stating that natural law empowers a nation to do "whatever is necessary for self-
preservation").
10. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 218-22
(W. Hastie trans., Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1887) (explaining in detail the three
different categories of rights).
11. Id. at 221-22.
12. OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 219.
13. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 217 (1992) (dating the modem era ofjus in bello to the 1860s).
14. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 280-98 (1906)
(discussing the establishment, implementation, and effect of peace treaties, but
lacking any discussion of jus post bellum).
[23:311
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To what extent is it necessary to re-think some of these
categorizations today?
This Article seeks to shed a closer light on these questions from an
inter-disciplinary perspective. Part I analyzes some of the features
and contours of jus post bellum as a domain of scholarship. It
examines why the idea ofjus post bellum has been neglected in legal
scholarship and why it should be taken seriously in the twentieth
century.
Part II highlights some of the outstanding scholarship problems.
An account of the existing literature indicates that jus post bellum is
treated differently in various disciplines, for example, between legal
scholars and just war theorists, and sometimes even within the very
same discipline."5 At least three areas appear to require further
clarification if the concept ofjus post bellum is to be developed from
a theoretical principle into a normative framework for the
organization of the transition from conflict to peace: the nature of the
concept, its substantive content, and its operation.
I. JUS POST BELLUM AS A DOMAIN OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the period of transition
from conflict to peace has been neglected in legal science.1 6 Works
by scholars such as Oppenheim 7 and Phillipson 8 outlined a number
of principles guiding the ending of wars and the formation of treaties
of peace. However, treatises of international law remained largely
silent on the question of whether, and to what extent, rules of
international law shape the very contents and grand strategies of
peacemaking. '9
15. See generally DiMeglio, supra note 3, at 134-62 (comparing three scholars'
approaches to analyzingjus post bellum).
16. See OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 218-21
(noting that this neglect has led to "ad hoc, patchwork 'solutions' to very serious
outbreaks of violence").
17. OPPENHEIM, supra note 14, at 280-98.
18. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE
(1916).
19. See OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 218
(stating that "there is next to no substantive law regulating the war-ending
process").
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This omission may be explained by several historical factors-the
gradual development of international law and the case-by-case
treatment of major peace settlements in the twentieth century 2°-but,
at the same time, it has some deeper structural reasons.
A. CAUSES OF SCHOLARLY DISREGARD
At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was difficult to
conceive of the period of transition from war to peace as a separate
normative paradigm because international law itself was seen as
bipolar system focused on the strict distinction between states of war
and peace. International law was composed of two sets of rules: the
law of peace and the law of war. Both types of rules were treated as
alternative frameworks. The law of peace was understood as the
body of law governing the normal state of affairs between states,
while war was viewed as a distinct concept which gave rise to a
different body of legal rules governing the relations between
belligerents.2 War and peace were seen as "ying" and "yang,"
namely as two aggregates which complemented each other.
However, the grey zone between these two poles, namely the
transition from war to peace, was not treated as a paradigm in terms
of law.22 This diametrical opposition is epitomized in the first
editions of Oppenheim's famous treatise on international law which
categorically distinguished the law of war and the law of peace.23 It
was only in the 1940s that international lawyers began to seriously
question this bipolar theorization of international law. 4
20. See generally IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2005)
(discussing major peace settlements and their effect on international legitimacy).
21. See STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY
177-96 (2005) (finding that throughout the nineteenth century, war and peace were
"seen as entirely distinct legal states, with no overlap").
22. See id. at 178 (discussing the need to separate war from peace but failing to
address any period of transition).
23. Volume I of this two-part treatise is entitled, "Peace." 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (H. Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1947). Volume II
of the treatise is entitled, "Disputes, War & Neutrality." 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (H. Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1940) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM, Volume 2 Sixth Edition].
24. Some authors began to advocate the existence of a grey zone between war
and peace in the 1940s, arguing that there are situations in international law that
are "incompatible with the states of peace and war." See Georg Schwarzenberger,
Jus Pacis Ac Belli?, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 470 (1943) (describing such situations
316 [23:311
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This finding coincides with a further systemic reason. The absence
of legal rules and principles was, to a certain extent, a corollary of a
prevailing conception of international law as jus inter gentes, rather
than a jus gentium.25 In a legal order that was centered on the
interests of states and interstate relations, peacemaking itself largely
was conceived as a process governed by the discretion of states.z6
The Treaty of Versailles, for instance, contained several traces of
modernity, such as the reference to the criminal accountability of the
German emperor, provisions for the protection of national minorities,
and integration of the founding instrument of the League of Nations
into the peace settlement.27 However, the goal of sustainable
peacemaking was overshadowed by the political interests
(Machtpolitik) of the victorious powers.28 The terms of the agreement
were essentially set by a bargaining process of the victors of the
rights and obligations of the vanquished.29 Reparations were punitive
to the extent that they were based on "war guilt."3 Moreover, self-
as a status mixtus, a term used to describe periods of time "incompatible with
states of peace and war"); see also Philip C. Jessup, Should International Law
Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98,
100-01 (1954) (describing three characteristics of a state of intermediacy: a
condition of hostility and strain between the opposing nations, the issues between
the parties are "fundamental and deep rooted," and an absence of intention or
decision to resort to war as a means of resolving these issues).
25. See Francisco Forrest Martin, Our Constitution as a Federal Treaty: A New
Theory of United States Constitutional Construction Based on an Originalist
Understanding For Addressing a New World, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269, 311
(2004) (pointing out that "jus inter gentes is only a subset ofjus gentium").
26. See Stahn, supra note 2, at 941 (arguing that peace-making is now
transitioning to "a pluralist and problem-solving approach to peace-making,
uniting affected parties, neutral actors and private stakeholders in their efforts to
restore sustainable peace").
27. See JOHN I. KNUDSON, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 177-78
(1938) (discussing the novelty of placing administration of Saar and Danzig in the
hands of a new international government of peoples, the League of Nations).
28. See generally id. at 28-41 (describing how the victorious states negotiated
the final peace settlement based solely upon their domestic political interests).
29. Id. at 37-38. The Treaty was negotiated primarily by the "Big Three,"
namely the United States, Great Britain, and France. Id. at 29. Germany was not
allowed to participate in the drafting of the treaty. Id. at 37-38. Only after the
Treaty was drafted were its terms communicated to the defeated powers. Id.
30. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
art. 231, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]; see JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 267-68 (1920)
(criticizing the severe financial burdens and cessions of territory within the treaty
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determination was not viewed as a binding legal rule, but as a
flexible principle.3' It had to yield where it conflicted with overriding
strategic interests of the victorious powers. 32 Therefore, it does not
come as a surprise that the process of peacemaking after war itself
was not codified in the inter-war period when jus ad bellum and jus
in bello began to emerge as legal notions.
The peace settlements after World War II present a slightly more
nuanced picture. Human rights clauses and provisions for criminal
adjudication became integral features of peace treaties with former
enemy powers.33 In the cases of Germany and Japan, victory was
as a threat to the financial equilibrium of Europe, and noting that "for at least a
generation[J ... Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of prosperity").
31. See KNUDSON, supra note 27, at 37-38 (acknowledging that the victorious
powers did not permit Germany to participate in framing the treaty and excluded
Germany from membership in the League at its inception).
32. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International
Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1998). Self-
determination did not serve as a means of ending colonial ambitions or as an
instrument to empower groups to foster their own national identity in general. Id.
at 31-35, 39. "It meant above all that the new borders of Europe would, to the
extent possible, be drawn along national lines." Id. at 32-33. The Mandates System
was partly created in order to ensure the orderly division of the colonies of the
defeated nations. Id. at 39. The German and Turkish colonies were transferred to
Australia, Belgium, Britain, France, Japan, New Zealand, and South Africa as
mandates. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 30, art. 22. The victors themselves
refused to place their own colonial possessions under this regime. See Orentlicher,
supra, at 39. Finally, in the context of territorial delimitation, self-determination
was only applied to selected territories of the defeated powers. Id.
33. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria arts. 2, 3, 5, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat.
1915, 41 U.N.T.S. 21; Treaty of Peace with Finland arts. 6, 9, Feb. 10, 1947, 48
U.N.T.S. 203; Treaty of Peace with Hungary arts. 2, 6, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat.
2065, 41 U.N.T.S. 644; Treaty of Peace with Italy arts. 15, 45, Feb. 10, 1947, 61
Stat. 1245, 49 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty of Peace with Romania arts. 3, 6, Feb. 10, 1947,
61 Stat. 1757, 42 U.N.T.S. 135 (exemplifying the trend of including human rights
clauses and criminal adjudication provisions in peace treaties). These agreements
were intended to prevent the resurgence of fascist or militaristic movements
through internal democratization on the basis of fundamental human rights. See,
e.g., Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, supra, art. 4; Treaty of Peace with Finland,
supra, art. 8; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, supra, art. 4; Treaty of Peace with
Italy, supra, art. 17; Treaty of Peace with Romania, supra, art. 5. A good example
is Article 17 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy which expressly states that "Italy ...
shall not permit the resurgence on Italian territory of [Fascist] organizations,
whether political, military or semi-military, whose purpose is to deprive the people
of their democratic rights." Treaty of Peace with Italy, supra, art. 17. A second
example can be found in the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, in which Japan
agreed to "create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in
[23:311
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combined with economic, social, and legal reconstruction.34 But
peacemaking continued to be treated as a negotiable settlement,
shaped by the open play of realist forces. The Charter rules were
declared inapplicable to the process of peacemaking with the
"enemy" powers.35 Germany and Japan were not administered under
the supervision of the United Nations or classical occupation law, but
under the exceptional rules of post-surrender occupation.36 The
Allied Powers continued to defend the view that forcible acquisitions
of territory were an appropriate recompense for wartime losses.37
Moreover, self-determination was applied in an incoherent fashion in
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by
post-surrender Japanese legislation." Treaty of Peace with Japan preamble, Sept. 8,
1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45; U.N. Charter arts. 55-56.
34. See Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 33, arts. 11-12 (requiring Japan
to give the victorious powers most-favored-nation status regarding the import and
export of goods, shipping, and navigation among other commercial activities);
Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional
Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to be
Imposed on Germany 12, Sept. 20, 1945, 3 Bevans 1254 (granting the Allied
powers authority to control all aspects of the German economy).
35. This is reflected in the "enemy state" clause contained in Article 107 of the
U.N. Charter, which states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall invalidate or
preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has
been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a
result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." U.N.
Charter art. 107.
36. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 91-93
(1993) (positing that the Allied forces justified their actions by reasoning that
Germany and Japan were in a state of subjugation and therefore the Allied forces
were "entitled to annex the territory or otherwise assume sovereign powers over
it").
37. Germany and Japan were stripped of their title to certain territories. Treaty
of Versailles, supra note 30, arts. 31-117; Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note
33, art. 2. The K6nigsberg area of East Prussia and South Sakhalin and the Kurile
Islands were passed on to the Soviet Union in return for Soviet participation in the
war. GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD
WAR It 789 (1994); Andrew Mack & Martin O'Hare, Moscow-Tokyo and The
Northern Territories Dispute, 30 ASIAN SURV. 380, 381-84 (1990). The U.S.
gained exclusive control over the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific, which
were later placed under the Trusteeship System. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra
note 33, art. 2. Furthermore, all German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line
(including Danzig and Eastern Prussia) with nearly nine million inhabitants, a
majority of whom were German, were ceded to Poland in order to provide a short
and more easily defensible border between Poland and Germany. WEINBERG,
supra, at 789.
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territorial settlements.3" Peacemaking was thus essentially regarded
as something exceptional that operated on a case-by-case basis and
outside the framework of the U.N. Charter. Some legal scholars like
Wilhelm Grewe continued to conceive of peacemaking as an "art"
rather than a legal paradigm until the 1980s. 39
B. THE CASE FOR RENEWED ATTENTION
Why does this conception require a fresh look at the beginning of
the twenty-first century? Currently, this very question is answered
differently by different protagonists and disciplines.
Scholars in the field of just war theory have offered a number of
theoretical explanations. It has been argued that "it is important to
better theorize postwar justice ... for the sake of a more complete
theory of just war. '40 Others claim that jus post bellum is needed for
strategic purposes, namely to avoid a fall into anarchy following
intervention.4' Again others, like Michael Walzer, have argued that
we need jus post bellum because the post-war execution of the goals
of war has an impact on the overall judgment of war 42-an argument
38. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
162 (1990) (noting that while the overseas empires of Western European states
began to dissolve, "large Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Polish, German,
Romanian, Hungarian and Slovak-inhabited territories in Europe were being
annexed arbitrarily by neighbouring states").
39. Wilhelm G. Grewe, Peace Treaties, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 938, 945 (Rudolf Bernhardt & Peter MacAlister-Smith eds.,
1997). See Bardo Fassbender, Stories of War and Peace on Writing the History of
International Law in the "Third Reich " and After, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 479 (2002),
for a further study of Grewe and for a discussion of Grewe's interpretation of
modern international law.
40. Bass, supra note 3, at 384.
41. See NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF
NATION BUILDING 2-3 (2004) (arguing that the collapse of law and order and
domestic structures following the Iraq intervention created a moral duty for
coalition members to stay in Iraq and a moral justification to exercise "temporary
political authority as trustee on behalf of the people being governed, in much the
same way that an elected government does").
42. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, DISSENT, Winter 2004,
at 61, available at http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=400 [hereinafter
Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations] (maintaining that fighting a just war can still
result in an unjust aftermath, and although a morally acceptable aftermath may not
justify an unjust war, it may be just in and of itself); Michael Walzer, Regime
Change and Just War, DISSENT, Summer 2006, at 103, available at
http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=663 (contending that, although regime
[23:311
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which attracted wide attention in the debate about the intervention in
Iraq.
In this latter context, the notion ofjus post bellum has also gained
some prominence in legal doctrine. Jus post bellum is increasingly
viewed by legal scholars as a framework to deal with the challenges
of state-building and transformation after intervention.43 Recently, it
has been associated with different phenomena such as transformative
occupation, 44 the conduct of legislative reform in post-conflict
zones, 45 or the consolidation of the rule of law after intervention
more generally.4
6
These observations provide evidence that the law of occupation is
increasingly perceived as an insufficient answer to the legal
challenges of peace-building. But it is necessary to go a step further.
The fundamental question is whether jus post bellum can be
understood in a broader normative sense, namely not only as a moral
principle or a legal catchword, but as a concept which regulates
conflicts of norms and the relationship between different actors in
conflict-related situations of transition.
Such a re-thinking of the existing categories of law has been
suggested in legal scholarship.47 It receives support from several
change is not part of the just war paradigm, it can be justified in the aftermath of a
just war when required by moral necessity).
43. See Jean L. Cohen, The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict
Constitution Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for "Interim Occupations ", 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 497, 501 (2006-2007) (arguing that although the jus post
bellum concept of belligerent occupation was ignored in post World War II
reconstruction, its conservation principle of prohibiting major changes to the
social, political, legal, and economic institutions of the occupied country remains
relevant in contemporary society).
44. Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of
War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 619 (2006).
45. See Boon, supra note 2, at 287 (arguing that "a just post bellum based on
the principles of trusteeship, accountability, and proportionality is necessary to
establish the rule of law" in occupied territories).
46. CHRISTIAN SCHALLER, STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK
[FOUNDATION FOR SCHOLARSHIP AND POLICY], PEACEBUILDING UND "IUS POST
BELLUM" [PEACE-BUILDING AND "JUS POST BELLUM"] (2006) (F.R.G.).
47. Roberts views "an emerging or future jus post bellum" as a basis to deal
with shortcomings of jus in bello. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 619 (reasoning
that jus post bellum could be used to resolve the tension that exists in current
international law with regard to the idea of "military intervention with a
transformative purpose"). For the argument that the idea ofjus post bellum cannot
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factors: certain structural changes in the international legal order,
international practice in the field of peacemaking, and apparent
inadequacies in the existing architecture of the law of armed force.
1. Erosion of the War/Peace Dichotomy
First, the classical war/peace dichotomy has lost its raison d'tre
with the outlawry of war and the blurring of the boundaries between
conflict and peace.48 Traces of the historic distinction between war
and peace are still present in some distinct areas of law, like the
effects of war on the law of treaties. 49 However, the applicability of
law no longer depends on the recognition of a state of war or a state
of peace.50 International law comes into play in situations which are
neither declared war nor part of peacetime relations, such as threats
to the peace.5 The most evident example is internal armed violence,
which according to recent statistics constitutes ninety-five percent of
armed violence in the last decade. 2
Transitions from conflict to peace are governed by a conglomerate
of rules and principles from different areas of law. International
military forces, for instance, which are traditionally bound by
wartime obligations, may be bound to respect certain peacetime
standards (such as habeas corpus guarantees), when exercising public
authority in a post-conflict environment. 3 Civilian authorities, by
simply be inserted into a modem context, but first must be "translated from a
moral principle into a legal notion," see Stahn, supra note 2, at 936-37.
48. See Robert Layton, The Effect of Measures Short of War on Treaties, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 96, 109 (1962) (noting that the "Charter of the United Nations is not
dependent on a finding of a 'resort to war' by a state in order to activate its peace-
protecting machinery").
49. International Law Commission, Analytical Guide: Effects of Armed
Conflicts on Treaties, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/l1IO.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2007).
50. See Layton, supra note 48, at 98 (finding that "the outbreak of war does not
necessarily terminate treaty obligations").
51. See id. at 109 (discussing the applicability of the U.N. Charter to hostilities
short of war, including "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression"); U.N. Charter ch. VII.
52. See HUMAN SECURITY CENTER, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND
PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 18 (2005) (cautioning that governments which deny
legitimacy to political adversaries will label internal violence as criminal, not
warfare, therefore stifling attempts to develop statistics on internal armed conflict).
53. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. Ass., Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo, Res.
No. 1417 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/
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contrast, may invoke certain conflict-related exceptions from
peacetime standards, in order to maintain orderly government.
Accordingly, the clear distinction between war and peace has
become open to challenge. It is oversimplistic to characterize legal
relations exclusively within the parameters of these two concepts.
There are multiple situations in which (what was formerly called) the
law of war and the law of peace apply simultaneously. Moreover, the
very contours of the concepts of war and peace have been blurred.
International law applies in situations of transition-in transitions
from conflict to peace or transitions from peace to conflict.54
2. International Practice
Second, and more importantly, one may witness the crystallization
of certain rules and institutional frameworks for the organization of
peace in international practice.5 Most modern peace treaties are
framed on the basis of the assumption that the ending of hostilities
requires not only measures to terminate conflict, but active steps to
build peace.56 This is reflected in the move from a negative to a
positive conception of peace under the U.N. Charter, the
peacemaking practice of the Security Council after the revitalization
of the collective security after the Cold War, and practice in the field
of development assistance, like human rights and democracy
clauses.57 In some contemporary documents, foreign nations have
been deemed to hold a "shared responsibility" for human security.58
documents/adoptedtext/ta05/eresl417.htm (requiring international military forces
to help create and then follow mechanisms to alleviate human rights problems in
Kosovo).
54. See Christine Bell et al., Justice Discourses in Transition, 13 Soc. &
LEGAL STUD. 305, 308 (2004) (explaining that gaps in domestic law and the need
for external reference points make international law of heightened importance
during periods of transition).
55. According to recent statistics, "[a]pproximately half of all the peace
settlements negotiated between 1946 and 2003 have been signed since the end of
the Cold War." HUMAN SECURITY CENTER, supra note 52, at 153. Empirical data
suggest that the "average number of conflicts terminated per year in the 1990s was
more than twice the average of all previous decades from 1946 onwards." Id.
56. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace:
Reflections on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary
World Politics, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 29-30 (1998).
57. See ROBERT MILLER, AID AS PEACEMAKER: CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE AND THIRD WORLD CONFLICT 9-10 (1992) (discussing the use of
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Modem peace agreements regularly contain a large regulatory
component, including numerous provisions on the organization of
public authority and individual rights, such as provisions on
transitional government, claims mechanisms, human rights clauses,
provisions on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, as well
as provisions on individual accountability.5 9 These regulatory norms
are complemented by structures and institutional frameworks to
foster compliance with legal obligations, including adjudicatory
bodies and mechanisms of third-party monitoring.6 °
Peacemaking has become an "international affair." Measures
adopted by international authorities to ensure the re-establishment of
war-torn territories or to assist in reconstruction are no longer
considered as unlawful interventions in domestic affairs of states, but
as steps facilitating the return from exception to normalcy.61 States
and international organizations have deployed various institutional
models to facilitate the consolidation of peace, such as governance or
assistance missions under the umbrella of peacekeeping, U.N.
development assistance to create durable settlements after the cessation of
hostilities); Reisman, supra note 56, at 13-15 (discussing the evolution of the
United Nations from a body devoted to suppressing war toward an organization
authorizing force where necessary to ensure self-determination, freedom, and
independence).
58. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, 138-139, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept.
20, 2005) (asserting that the United Nations, as representative of the international
community, has the responsibility to "help protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity").
59. See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 396-97 (2006) (discussing the precision used in peace
agreements in order to legalize the obligations contained therein, specifically in
regards to immediate military disarmament and the political changes contemplated
by the parties).
60. See id. at 400-03 (noting that elaborate agreements, underwritten by the
Security Council, are often crucial to the peacemaking process).
61. SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE 153 (2004). The United Nations
and regional organizations have not only assisted in the reconstruction of war-torn
societies, but have shaped the legal and political foundations of domestic societies
in cases such as Namibia, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, East Timor, and
Liberia. See, e.g., RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-
TORN TERRITORIES: RULE AND RECONSTRUCTION 179-95 (2005); CHESTERMAN,
supra, at 126-52 (discussing the extent of consultation with local actors and the
accountability of international actors within the U.N. transitional governments
established in Kosovo and East Timor); JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., THE UN's ROLE IN
NATION-BUILDING: FROM THE CONGO TO IRAQ (2005).
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transitional administrations, or multinational forms of
administration.62
The rise of human rights obligations and growing limitations on
sovereignty and non-intervention have not only changed the attitude
toward the ending of conflicts, but have also set certain benchmarks
for behavior.6 3 The process of peacemaking itself has become a
domain of international attention and regulatory action.A This is
evidenced by the regulatory practice of the U.N. Security Council. It
is also evidenced by the development of law and practice concerning
the accountability of international organizations and peace support
operations, 65 the extraterritorial application of human rights norms, 66
and the obligations of states in cases of state succession. 67 It is
sometimes suggested that international organizations and states
should be subject to comparable obligations in terms of immunity
62. See CAPLAN, supra note 61, at 179-95 (noting that although executive
international authority may be necessary, self governance with international
assistance is sometimes possible in post conflict areas); CHESTERMAN, supra note
61, at 126-52
63. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, supra note 33, arts. 2-5 (protecting
human rights in Bulgaria, irrespective of citizenship).
64. See Bell, supra note 59, at 373 (indicating that international standards, such
as U.N. guidelines and Security Council resolutions, regulate both the process of
negotiation and the substance of peace agreements).
65. See generally MARTEN ZWANENBURG, ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACE
SUPPORT OPERATIONS 7-8 (Christopher Greenwood & Timothy L.H. McCormack
eds., 2005) (discussing conduct during peace support operations, the scope of
applicability of international humanitarian law in peace support operations, and the
responsibility and accountability of peace support operations in case of breaches of
international humanitarian law).
66. See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of
the Covenant: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State
Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6 (Apr. 21, 2004)
(observing the requirement of states to ensure that rights are afforded to all persons
within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, regardless of nationality or
statelessness); Theodor Meron, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti:
Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 78 (1995)
(emphasizing that the armed forces of a state must adhere to the law of war
"regardless of whether they operate in or outside the territory of that state").
67. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, 4, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/53/40/Annex VII (Sept. 15, 1998) (asserting that once
people are afforded rights under the Covenant, such rights will continue to belong
to them regardless of state succession or other change in government).
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and accountability when exercising public authority. 68 Moreover,
some of the grand strategies of peacemaking-like democratization
and economic liberalization-are governed by a network of
obligations flowing from the law of international organizations,
multilateral treaty commitments, or donor conditionality.69
It is therefore appropriate and timely to treat peacemaking not only
as a political process, but also a legal phenomenon.
3. On the Use of a Jus Post Bellum
This postulate is not reflected in the current architecture of
international law. The contemporary law of armed force continues to
be based on the traditional distinction betweenjus ad bellum andjus
in bello.7 ° The process of peacemaking after conflict is not reflected
as a separate paradigm.7
An extension of the existing categories is not without risks. One of
the dangers is that post bellum motives might be used as a pretext for
68. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTIT. IN Kosovo, SPECIAL REPORT No. 1 ON THE
COMPATIBILITY WITH RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF UNMIK
REGULATION No. 2000/47 ON THE STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF KFOR
AND UNMIK AND THEIR PERSONNEL IN KOSOVO AND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE ABOVE REGULATION, 84 (2001), available at http://www.ombudsperson
kosovo.org/repository/docs/E4010426a.pdf (recommending that the immunity
afforded to UNMIK and the NATO-led Kosovo Force be limited); EUROPEAN
COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, Opinion on Human Rights in
Kosovo: Possible Establishment of Review Mechanisms, 60th Sess., Doc. No. 280,
63-64 (2004) (delineating the reasons why international organizations are
immune from legal process by courts of member states and other institutional
organizations); Res. No. 1417, supra note 53, 5(ix) (reviewing the current state
of immunities afforded to UNMIK and KFOR); see also Frederic Mgret &
Florian Hoffman, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 314,
342 (2003) (advocating a "three-tiered system allocating human rights
responsibility[ies]" to the United Nations depending on its degree of control over a
state's sovereignty).
69. See Stahn, supra note 2, at 937 (indicating that "peace-making is not
merely determined by the discretion and contractual liberty of the warring factions,
but is governed by certain norms and standards of international law").
70. Id. at 924-25.
71. See id. at 930 (criticizing the failure to consider peacemaking after conflict
as a separate paradigm in light of the inherent link between recourse to force and
restoration of peace).
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validating of questionable uses of force. However, if properly
construed, ajus post bellum may ultimately provide certain benefits.
a. Closing a Normative Gap
A jus post bellum might, first of all, fill a certain normative gap.
At present, there is no organizing framework for transitions from
conflict to peace. It is often difficult to ascertain which rules apply to
domestic and international actors, since the international and the
domestic legal order converge in processes of transition. Acts of
international actors may directly become of the domestic legal
system, while acts of domestic authorities may be subject to
increased international scrutiny. Moreover, there is no clear guidance
as to how possible conflicts between applicable norms and principles
of international law-human rights law as opposed to international
humanitarian law--ought to be resolved."
The articulation of a jus post bellum may mitigate these gaps. It
may help identify rules of conflict and set limitations to the conduct
of international actors. It may also provide guidance concerning the
legal policy choices to be made in light of conflicting norms in
situations of transition.73
b. Closing a Systemic Gap
Second, a re-thinking of the existing categories might serve a
certain systemic function. In contemporary international law, the
rules governing recourse to force and the prospects of peacemaking
after conflict are widely regarded as different paradigms. Each
category is treated as its own distinct universe. This vision is open to
challenge in an era in which the very justification for the use of force
is tied to the very purpose of restoring or enhancing sustainable
peace. One of the advantages of a contemporary jus post bellum is
that it might establish a closer nexus between the justification and
motive of the use of force and the corresponding responsibilities in
the aftermath of intervention74 Ajus post bellum might require states
and international actors to assess the implications of the recourse to
72. Id. at 941-42.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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force on the post-intervention phase before deciding whether or not
to use force in the first place. Moreover, it may compel intervening
powers to contemplate and provide the necessary institutional
frameworks to ensure sustainable peacemaking after recourse to
force.75
The case for a jus post bellum is to some extent inherent in the
conception of jus ad bellum.76 Even under jus ad bellum, it is
sometimes not enough to establish that the motives which led to the
recourse to force pursued a lawful and commonly accepted
purpose.77 A use of force in self-defense or under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter may have to be followed by action that is appropriate
and capable of removing the threat that motivated the use of force by
virtue of the principle of proportionality.7" If it is clear at the outset
that an invention will lead to a violent insurgency which may prevent
the establishment of a just peace, the jus post bellum might provide
an argument not to resort to war in the first place.
A jus post bellum might also set certain legal constraints and
guidelines for the exercise of public authority in a subsequent post-
conflict engagement.7 9 It "might provide the necessary parameters
and benchmarks to determine whether the respective goals have been
implemented in a fair and effective manner and in accordance with
the law."80 An assessment of the "post bellum" record of an entity
might further help distinguish political rhetoric from legitimate
motivation in cases of intervention for humanitarian purposes.81
75. Id. at 942.
76. OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 162. A similar argument is
made in the context of just war theory, under which one of the criteria of thejus ad
bellum is reasonable hope of success. Id.
77. See BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE 135 (2000)
(recognizing that a war initiated and fought justly may nevertheless result in unjust
terms of settlement).
78. See Anand Panyarachun, Report of the Chairman of the High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, 207, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004) (advocating such an approach and establishing criteria for the
authorization of interventions by the Security Council).
79. Stahn, supra note 2, at 942.
80. Id.
81. Fr~d~ric M~gret, Jus in bello and Jus ad bellum, 100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
121, 123 (2006).
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c. Reconfiguring Jus in Bello
Last but not least, the development of post-conflict law may have
certain implications for the contemporary jus in bello. The jus in
bello is designed to address temporary power vacuums after conflict.
Its focus lies on the maintenance of public security and order, as well
as the protection of the interests of domestic actors. It contains only a
''nucleus" of legal principles devoted to the ending of hostilities and
the re-establishment of peace. The move towards a jus post bellum
might prevent an artificial merger and conflation of the jus in bello
with objectives (like state-building or transformation after
intervention) that it is ill-suited to achieve in light of its limited
temporal scope of application and its traditional focus on the
obligations of armed forces.82
Considerations of fair and just peace may be taken into account in
an indirect fashion under a tripartite conception of the law of armed
force. They might serve as an overarching umbrella for the limitation
of the aims and effects of armed conflict. The jus post bellum would
require the respective parties to conduct their hostilities in a manner
which does not defeat the prospects of a fair and just peace
settlement after the conflict.83
I. THE SCHOLARSHIP AGENDA
Although these considerations make it worthwhile to revive the
idea of a jus post bellum in modem international law, the concept
requires further refinement from a conceptual perspective. At least
three areas need further clarification ifjus post bellum is to be taken
seriously as a domain of scholarship, namely the general meaning of
the concept, its content, and its operation.
A. THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT
There is some agreement that the concept of jus post bellurn is
meant to address challenges of conflict termination and peacemaking
82. Stahn, supra note 2, at 942-43.
83. Id.
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which are not covered by jus ad bellum or jus in bello.84 The notion
has been defined in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a
concept which that "seeks to regulate the ending of wars and to ease
the transition from war back to peace."85 However, until present the
concept has still had different meanings to different audiences.
1. Foundation
One of the dilemmas of the contemporary discourse overjus post
bellurn is the disregard and occasional misperception of the legal
domain. This shortcoming has caused confusion about the foundation
ofjus post bellum.
a. Beyond Morality
Jus post bellum has been mostly considered as a moral paradigm,
namely as an extension of just war theory.86 Part of the justification
for this approach has been derived from an assumed lack of legal
rules. It has been argued that the issue of morality becomes so
important because "[t]here is little international law here-save
occupation law and perhaps the human rights treaties."87 The use of
extra-legal parameters has thus been invoked as an argument to
strengthen the case for moral reflection on intervention.88
This argument needs to be refined. A shift from law to morality is
visible and defendable in areas where the parameters of law itself are
in flux or dispute, such as in the context of humanitarian
84. See Boon, supra note 2, at 291-92 (stating that jus post bellum has distinct
end goals of establishing security, creating the political and economic basis for
independence, and promoting a democratic process).
85. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2.3, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fa112007/entries/war/.
86. See FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 3 (proposing a similar argument in the
context of nation-building in Iraq); OREND, supra note 77, at 135-36 (emphasizing
that just war theory proponents have used moral justifications to argue that a "just
war" requires a "just peace").
87. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 85, § 2.3.
88. See S.K. Sharma, Reconsidering the Jus ad Bellum/Jus in bello Distinction,
http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/sharma.pdf (using the example of the NATO
intervention in Kosovo to demonstrate why international law should consider
moral and ethical considerations rather than relying exclusively on strict adherence
to the division betweenjus ad bellum andjus in bello).
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intervention. 9 In this area, recourse to extra-legal justifications has
even become an integral part of the vocabulary of international law.90
However, this does not mean that a potential jus post bellum must be
exclusively of a moral nature. 91
There is some room to argue that international law contains an
existing pool of norms and principles, which goes beyond a moral
responsibility after conflict. The substantive components of
peacemaking are no longer exclusively determined by the discretion
and contractual liberty of the warring factions, but are governed by
certain norms and standards of international law derived from
different fields of law and legal practice. 92 Some of these obligations
are tied to factual considerations such as effective control, and are
therefore partly beyond the will of states. This network of law and
regulations may be deemed to form the foundations of 'Jus" in the
legal sense, which complements the jus post bellum under just war
theory.93
89. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 180-82 (2002) (providing that international
lawyers have used the legality/legitimacy distinction in the case of Kosovo in order
to deal with the dilemma of an unauthorized intervention).
90. See id. (illustrating this recourse to extra-legal justifications in the context
of humanitarian intervention with the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which,
although not strictly legal, was legitimate in the sense that it was "congruent with
an 'international moral consensus').
91. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 268 (concluding that even
moral philosophers occasionally combine ethical considerations with legal
argumentation).
92. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties governs the
formation of peace settlements and considerations of procedural fairness; the
prohibition of annexation and the law of self-determination define the limits of
territorial dispute resolution. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 52,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The consequences of an act of aggression are
inter alia determined by parameters of the law of state responsibility, Charter-
based considerations of proportionality and human rights-based limitations on
reparations; the exercise of foreign governance over territory is limited by the
principle of territorial sovereignty, the prohibition of "trusteeship" (over U.N.
members) under Article 78 of the Charter, limits of occupation law under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as the powers of the Security Council under
the Charter; the law applicable in a territory in transition is determined by the law
of state succession as well certain provisions of human rights law, like non-
derogable human rights guarantees, and the laws of occupation; finally, the scope
of individual criminal responsibility is defined by treaty-based and customary law-
based prohibitions of international criminal law. U.N. Charter art. 78.
93. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 'Jus" as
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b. Law v. Law
The current theorization of the concept suffers further from a
fragmented and sector-specific vision of jus post bellum by legal
scholars. The notion has been used to describe partially different
legal paradigms. International humanitarian lawyers tend to viewjus
post bellum primarily as an alternative, as in, a "law of post-war
reconstruction."94 Criminal lawyers would associate jus post bellum
more closely with the concept of justice after war, and treat it
primarily under the label of criminal accountability. 95 Human rights
lawyers would regard it as a surrogate framework of law in situations
of emergency.96 Others again might view it as a nucleus of a
"responsibility to rebuild" after military intervention.
This piecemeal approach is misguided. An area-specific vision of
jus post bellum is neither in line with the historic tradition of the
notion, nor helpful from a systemic point of view. It fails to address
one of the principal dilemmas of contemporary international law,
namely to define the interplay between different legal orders and
bodies of law in situations of transition.97 It is more appropriate to
understand jus post bellum in a holistic sense, namely as a broader
regulatory framework, which contains not only substantive legal
a "system of law"), with STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note
85, § 2.3 (characterizing the new concept of jus post bellum as a set of moral
principles).
94. Boon, supra note 2, at 285.
95. See Davida A. Kellogg, Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes
Trials, PARAMETERS, Autumn 2002, at 87, 91-94 (arguing that jus post bellum
involves acknowledging that "atrocious crimes [may] have been perpetrated" and
"judg[ing] and exact[ing] punishment" for these crimes). The author defines jus
post bellum as "justice in the wake of war" and argues that "the proper venue for
working justice in the wake of war is the war crimes tribunal." Id. at 89, 94.
96. See Williams & Caldwell, supra note 3, at 317-18 (laying out four human
rights-based principles ofjus post bellum that are transitional in nature and aimed
at restoring the "status quo ante bellum"). In their treatment of jus post bellum,
Williams and Caldwell argue that "[a] just peace exists when the human rights of
those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the
war." Id. at 309.
97. See Stahn, supra note 2, at 924 (arguing that it is "increasingly clear that
some of the problems arising in the period of transition from conflict to peace
cannot be addressed by a simple application of the 'law of peace' or the 'laws of
war', but require 'situation-specific' adjustments, such as organizing frameworks
and principles which are specifically geared towards the management of situations
of transition between conflict and peace").
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rules and principles governing transitions from conflict to peace, but
also rules on their interplay and relationship in case of conflict.98
2. Scope of Application
Ifjus post bellum is developed into a broader concept of law, it is
further necessary to define its scope of application. It must, in
particular, be specified in which circumstances jus post bellum
comes into play.
According to its traditional understanding, jus post bellum is
triggered by inter-state wars. Any modern perspective of this concept
would be markedly different from that which occupied the minds of
the scholars who first addressed this area. Today, the very notion
itself is, to some extent, a misnomer. A modern jus post bellum must
apply after events other than classical wars. It would need to be
connected to the broader notion of international armed conflicts and
even certain kinds of interventions that are not directly contemplated
by the jus in bello under the Geneva Conventions, such as
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.99
In addition, ajus post bellum would have to apply in the aftermath
of civil wars.' ° Internal armed violence is covered by the
contemporary jus in bello1' and has been the object of increased
98. See id. at 937-38, 941-42 (discussing the entangled norms that make up this
"regulatory framework," and proposing a holistic law that connectsjus ad bellum,
jus in bello, and jus post bellum to decrease the "uncertainty about applicable law
[and] the interplay of different structural frameworks . . . in a post conflict
environment"). Sometimes, different legal provisions may conflict or compete with
each other. For example, an immediate duty to prosecute may conflict with the
parallel responsibility of the host state to protect the security of its people. An
individual's right of access to a court may conflict with the immunity of
international organizations that exercise public authority in a post-conflict territory.
Such conflicts must be solved by way of a hierarchy of norms or a balancing of
principles. "Some norms (for instance, jus cogens prohibitions) constitute 'hard'
law ('rules'). They are applicable 'in an all-or nothing fashion'. Others are based
on broader principles which may be balanced against each other. . . ." Id. at 937-
38.
99. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 619 (noting that jus post bellum also arises
"after a foreign military intervention").
100. Id.
101. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1,
June 8, 1997, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513 ("This Protocol ... shall apply to all armed
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attention and regulation in the past decades. 02 A legal jus post
bellum would thus need to embrace a corpus of rules of jus post
bellum internum, which take into account the specificities of
peacemaking in internal armed conflicts.
At the same time, the temporal scope of application of jus post
bellum must be redefined. Historically, the dividing line between war
and peace has been the conclusion of a peace treaty. 0 3 Today,
however, reality is more complex. A conflict can no longer be
temporally defined simply by looking at the date of signature of the
relevant peace treaty, nor will the conclusion of a peace treaty
necessarily mean the definitive end of hostilities.' ° The question of
when a period can accurately be described as being "after" hostilities
may need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Jus post bellum
might, for instance, apply after a factual end of hostilities or after a
Security Council Resolution. °5
conflicts.., which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized groups which...
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations ...."); Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 (regulating conduct
such as treatment of people not active in hostilities and treatment of the wounded
and sick in "conflict not of an international character").
102. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 67, 134 (Oct. 2, 1995)
(applying the law of war to the then ongoing internal conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8(2)(c), June 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 1-38544 (specifying behavior that is
considered a war crime during a conflict "not of an international character"). See
generally Franqois Bugnion, Jus ad bellum, Jus in bello and Non-International
Armed Conflicts, in 6 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 167,
190-97 (T. McCormack & Avril McDonald eds., 2003) (looking tojus in bello and
jus ad bellum in seeking to develop the law of non-international armed conflict).
103. OPPENHEIM, Volume 2 Sixth Edition, supra note 23, at 469.
104. See Williams & Caldwell, supra note 3, at 315 (noting, in describing
different types of wars, that "some wars are followed by continued resistance or
unconventional war").
105. See Bardo Fassbender, Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The
Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council After a Decade of Measures
Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 273, 279 (2002) (observing that some scholars
have pointed to Security Council Resolutions as being the "substitute peace
treaties" of recent times).
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Greater flexibility is also required with respect to possible length
of application. Jus post bellum is a law of transition by definition. 16
This means that it must cease to apply at a certain moment.10 7
Traditionally, it has been argued that jus post bellum is aimed at the
preservation or return to the legal status quo ante, which formed the
logical endpoint of this concept.0 8 Today, however, such a vision is
overly restrictive.
It may fit in some cases of an international armed conflict where
State A has invaded State B and State B fights back. However, it is
of little use in cases where the effects of the use of force make the
restoration of the pre-war situation impossible. 0 9 Moreover, the
rationale of return to the status quo ante itself is misplaced in some
contexts. If an intervention has been preceded by an internal armed
conflict, it does not make sense to return to the situation that led to
the conflict in the first place or to restore the social and political
order that caused the humanitarian crisis."' In these cases, the
establishment of fair and just peace requires positive transformations
of the domestic order of a society, since peace settlement should
106. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 85, § 2.3
(stating that jus post bellum seeks to regulate the ending of wars and to ease the
transition from war back to peace).
107. This type of cessation seems to originally have been envisioned by the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that many of its articles are no longer
applicable "one year after the general close of military operations." Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 6,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 973. However, the Convention
struggles with the concept of jus post bellum ceasing at a specific point and
extends the applicability of some provisions "for the duration of the occupation, to
the extent that [a] Power exercises the functions of government in [a] territory."
Id.; see Roberts, supra note 44, at 587-89 (discussing the timeline for cessation as
a challenging concept, even at the time of drafting, and concluding that the concept
now "bear[s] little or no relevance to actual occupations" because "not all
occupations can be subject to exactly the same rules").
108. Michael Walzer, Speech at the Heinrich B611 Foundation 14 (July 2, 2003),
available at http://www.boell.de/alt/downloads/aussen/walzer-judging__war.pdf.
109. See, e.g., id. (discussing the situation in Iraq following the 2003 U.S.
invasion). "Sovereignty can be forfeit ... in cases of repeated aggression or in the
aftermath of a humanitarian intervention .... The victorious and now occupying
power has to maintain law and order . . .and find some way to establish a new
regime." Id.
110. OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 224 (citing
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 119 (1977)).
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ideally achieve a higher level of human rights protection,
accountability, and good governance than in the period before the
resort to armed force." I
A modem jus post bellum would be focused on the sustainability
of peace, rather than on simply brokering an end to violence." 2 This
focus gives jus post bellum a dynamic scope of application. It might
come to apply in situations which are in reality in pacem or ante
bellum.
B. THE CONTENT
The articulation of a legal jus post bellum requires further a
refinement of its normative content." 3 Currently, there are various
synergies between just war theory and propositions by legal scholars.
But there is no agreement on a canon ofjus post bellum principles. 114
Moral philosophers have applied classical principles of just war
theory when defining jus post bellum, such as just cause, right
intention, public declaration, legitimate authority, discrimination and
proportionality." 5 Brian Orend, for instance, offers the following
principles: proportionality and publicity of the peace settlement,
rights vindication, discrimination, punishment, compensation, and
rehabilitation. 1 6 Bass suggests that a jus post bellum should
111. See Williams & Caldwell, supra note 3, at 316 (explaining that one
principle ofjus post bellum is that "a war is conducted justly.., when the human
rights of those involved in the war... are more secure than they were before the
war").
112. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 181 (stating that a just
peace demands an "ethical 'exit strategy"' in addition to a military one); DiMeglio,
supra note 3, at 162 (arguing that securing a lasting peace is one of three criteria
defining "the parameters of a just peace under the general framework of the just
war tradition").
113. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 85, § 2.3
(stating that there is a "newness, unsettledness and controversy" connected with
the definition and principles ofjus post bellum).
114. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 180-81 (listing some
often "discussed and defended" settlement principles despite the need for
"flexibility and sensitivity" within the canon).
115. See OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 232-33
(including all of these terms in his "coherent set of substantive principles for jus
post bellum"); Bass, supra note 3, at 412 (considering prudence along with
proportionality in his discussion ofjus post bellum).
116. OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 180-81. Orend describes the
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encompass, inter alia, the conduct of war crimes trials,"17
compensatory reparation," 8 and the "duty to respect to the greatest
extent possible the sovereignty of the defeated nation and seek the
consent of the defeated in any project for reconstruction,"' which
would require "that victorious states . . . render themselves
accountable to the population they purport to assist, seeking to gain
their consent for the actions taken on their behalf."' 20 Michael
Walzer proposed similar guidelines for a jus post bellum following
the Iraq intervention.'2 ' Walzer noted:
Democratic political theory, which plays a relatively small part in our
arguments about jus ad bellum and in bello, provides the central
principles of [post-war justice]. They include self-determination, popular
listed principles as follows:
[1] Proportionality and Publicity. The peace settlement should be both
measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed .... In general, this
rules out insistence on unconditional surrender. [2] Rights Vindication. The
settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the
justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and
community entitlements to territory and sovereignty .... [3] Discrimination.
Distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the
civilians in the defeated country .... [4] Punishment #1. When the defeated
country has been a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate
punishment must be meted out. The leaders of the regime, in particular,
should face fair and public international trials for war crimes ....
[5] Punishment #2. Soldiers also commit war crimes. Justice after war
requires that such soldiers, from all sides to the conflict, likewise be held
accountable to investigation and possible trial. [6] Compensation. Financial
restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and
discrimination .... [7] Rehabilitation. The post-war environment provides a
promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime.
Such reforms are permissible ... but they must be proportional to the degree
of depravity in the regime. They may involve: demilitarization and
disarmament; police and judicial re-training; human rights education; and
even deep structural transformation towards a minimally just society
governed by a legitimate regime. Id.
117. Bass, supra note 3, at 404.
118. See id. at 408-09 (arguing that the aggressors should pay the costs of
economic restoration, in particular war supporters and profiteers).
119. Id. at 392.
120. Id. at 401.
121. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, supra note 42, at 61-63 (arguing
that the United States must be prepared to invest adequate resources to reconstruct
Iraq, committed to seeing through a just post-conflict outcome and, "prepared to
cede power to a legitimate and genuinely independent Iraqi government" that may,
in the end, not act according to U.S. interests).
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legitimacy, civil rights, and the idea of a common good. We want wars to
end with governments in power in the defeated states that are chosen by
the people they rule-or, at least, recognized by them as legitimate-and that
are visibly committed to the welfare of those same people (all of them).
We want minorities protected against persecution, neighboring states
protected against aggression, the poorest of the people protected against
destitution and starvation.
122
These general principles are not so far removed from rules and
principles which may be derived from a survey of international
practice, such as a requirement of fairness and inclusiveness of peace
settlements; the exclusion of territorial mutilation as punishment for
aggression; the humanization of reparations and sanctions; the
distinction between collective responsibility and individual
responsibility; and accountability for mass crimes.'23
However, they leave many questions unanswered. Firstly, the
existing propositions continue to be shaped by just war theory, which
was developed on the basis of the criteria of classical warfare.1 24 Jus
post bellum principles are thus focused on international armed
conflicts.1 25 Internal armed conflicts are widely ignored.
Secondly, problems arise when these principles are translated into
a more concrete context, such as state- or nation-building. 126 One
may easily agree with the argument that principles of accountability,
popular consent, and closure-the sustainable assistance beyond the
122. Id.
123. See Carsten Stahn, Jus ad bellum - Jus in bello . . . Jus post bellum:
Towards a Tripartite Conception of Armed Conflict, www.esil-
sedi.eu/english/pdf/Stahn2.PDF (discussing each of these principles in detail and
advocating that they "form part of an emerging body of post-conflict law").
124. See James Turner Johnston, Just War, As It Was and Is, FIRST THINGS, Jan.
1, 2005, at 1-2 (describing the historical genesis of classic just war theory with a
focus on its theological antecedents, and noting that the past forty years have seen
a resurgence of the idea of just war in Christian ethical discourse).
125. See Rigby, supra note 3, at 179 (noting the increasing prevalence of intra-
state wars in the past ten years). The author proposes that elements of durable
peace settlements must take into account the unique issues posed by intra-state
wars. Id. at 188-89.
126. See, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, supra note 42, at 61-63
(noting the distinction between the arguments relating to the occupation of Iraq and
the arguments for invasion, and the importance of democratic political theory in
the formulation of the view that the United States has an obligation to reconstruct
Iraq).
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point of holding elections-should form part of any jus post bellum
framework after intervention. 27 Yet, it is doubtful to what extent
there can be a "blueprint" for transitions from conflict to peace.
Some proposals to that effect have been made in different
contexts. It has been suggested to develop a model code of criminal
procedure 28 or a toolkit to create "Government out of a Box."'2 9
Others have endeavored to formulate a recipe to transform "defeated,
rights-violating aggressor regimes into stable [and] peaceful . ..
societies," which would include strategies such as policing, capacity-
building, or the restoration of local ownership. 30
Such efforts are guided by noble intentions, but are overly
simplistic. 3' The individual situations differ, and so do the policies
required to ensure sustainable peace. For example, in some cases, a
quick withdrawal of foreign troops may be the best remedy to secure
stability and fairness, while a prolonged military engagement may be
desirable in other cases. 3 2 Where some form of support and
127. See id. (discussing these principles in the context of the Iraqi occupation
and suggesting that U.S. goals of democracy and federalism in Iraq are examples
of this sustainable assistance).
128. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 81-83,
delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/809, A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 2000) (presenting the central idea of an ongoing
project to create a criminal code that contains the "basics of both law and
procedure to enable an operation to apply due process using international jurists
and internationally agreed standards").
129. See Michael von der Schulenburg, CRISIS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE,
GOVERNMENT OUT OF A Box: SOME IDEAS OF DEVELOPING A TOOL BOX FOR
PEACE-BUILDING 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.cmi.fi/files/GooB-report
_2004.pdf (noting that these toolkits would aim to use modem technology to build
infrastructure, a local civil service, and foster a sense of national ownership).
130. See OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 204-08 (suggesting a
"ten-point recipe for reconstruction" while recognizing that each case will require
special "ingredients").
131. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,
31, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/502 (Oct. 20, 2000)
(doubting "whether it would be practical, or even desirable given the diversity of
country specific legal traditions, for the Secretariat to elaborate a model criminal
code, whether worldwide, regional, or civil or common-law based, for use by
future transitional administration missions").
132. See, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, supra note 42, at 61-63
(noting that the four year occupation of Nazi Germany was necessary to bring Nazi
leaders to trial and institute general "denazification," while in Iraq, it might be
argued that an extended occupation and comparable "debaathification" is not
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assistance in state-building is requested or required in a specific
situation, opinions differ greatly concerning the desirable strategy to
be applied. 33 Some authorities, such as Roland Paris, argue that
institutionalization should generally come before liberalization and
standard-setting in order to provide space for domestic dialogue
about normative principles of a domestic polity. 13 4 Others suggest
that action in specific sectors such as criminal justice and the rule of
law should be prioritized immediately after conflict in order to put
the process of peace-building on the right track from the start. 35
Thirdly, it is still unclear in existing literature from which sources
such principles are and ought to be derived.136 In contemporary
scholarship, moral or legal considerations-soft law-are often
interwoven with policy assessments or recommendations. This turn
necessary because a majority of the population was not a part of the Baath regime).
133. See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL
CONFLICT 185-87 (2004) (summarizing the approaches of different theorists to
peace-building). For example, the author contrasts the arguments "in favor of
restricting political participation and political mobilization" with other
commentators' emphasis on the "psychological sources of unrest during the
modernization process." Id. at 186 n.22.
134. See id. at 185-88 (examining methods of turning war-tom states into liberal
market democracies by avoiding the "destabilizing side effects" of liberalization).
Paris explains that peace-builders tend to believe that elections have a pacifying
effect without considering their potential negative effects. Id. at 188-89. The
proposed solution for peacebuilders includes the following:
1) postponing elections until moderate political parties have been created, and
mechanisms to ensure compliance with the results of the election have been
established; 2) designing electoral rules that reward moderation instead of
extremism; 3) encouraging the development of civil-society organizations that
cut across lines of societal conflict . . . ; 4) regulating incendiary 'hate
speech'; 5) promoting economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate
societal tensions; and 6) developing effective security institutions and a
professional, neutral bureaucracy.
Id.
135. See Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN
State-Building, SURVIVAL, Autumn 2002, at 37, 37-38 (examining the United
Nation's "light footprint" approach in the context of Afghanistan, where it has
focused on strengthening Afghan capacity to promote sustainability and a sense of
national ownership).
136. See Stahn, supra note 123, at 4 (noting that the source of post-conflict law
is unclear because "few attempts have been undertaken to ... fill the notion of
post-conflict law with concrete legal content," but stating that there is a modem
tendency "to move from a statist and national-interest driven conception of conflict
termination to a pluralist and problem-solving approach to peacemaking").
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to policy may be useful to develop best practices for certain actors
(as done by U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations'37 or the
World Bank,'38 for example), but it is shaky from a normative point
of view. 3 9 Some of the existing institutional frameworks and
practices, like the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
("UNMIK") and the Office of the High Representative ("OHR")
"standards before status" practice, 40 do not necessarily lend
themselves to further replication or elevation to normative rules or
principles. Moreover, many of the facets and hidden side-effects of
state-building and reconstruction under international auspices are
still unexplored. 14 More empirical research appears to be necessary
137. See generally PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES UNIT, UNITED NATIONS,
HANDBOOK ON UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
(2003) [hereinafter PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HANDBOOK] (providing an
overview of the principles and practices of U.N. peacekeeping operations).
138. See generally Kirsti Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict
Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt (World Bank, Soc. Dev.
Papers: Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Paper No. 37, 2006) (summarizing
initiatives and policies frequently implemented by agencies and institutions
undertaking rule of law reform and seeking to highlight issues that may arise in the
process).
139. See Jean-Marie Gu6henno, Foreword to PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at vii (stating that the Handbook is not "intended to
provide strategic or policy guidance"). Instead, "it is intended to provide [new]
field personnel . . . with general background on the responsibilities of each
component of [U.N.] operations and how these fit together to form the whole." Id.
140. This policy raises some intriguing questions from the point of view of the
right to self-government and political legitimacy. Do such benchmarks require
prior domestic consent? Can compliance be assessed objectively? Do such policies
ensure that the underlying norms and values are properly internalized in domestic
society? See Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the
Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate, 16 EUR. J.
iNT'L L. 637, 640 (2005), for a critical analysis of the "standards before status" or
"earned sovereignty" approach in which progress is determined by benchmarks
indicating good governance.
141. See DAVID CHANDLER, EMPIRE IN DENIAL: THE POLITICS OF STATE-
BUILDING 4 (2006) (emphasizing that even though state-building initiatives are
increasing in number, "there has been little theoretical engagement with state-
building as a policy framework . . . or in terms of the consequences" for the
recipient state); DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 347 (2004) (adopting a critical view of
international humanitarianism or state-building, and, in part, criticizing
humanitarian policymakers for fleeing "the political struggles which go with the
exercise of power and with uncertainty over truth").
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in order to identify reliable organizing principles for post-conflict
peace.
C. "JUS POST BELLUM" IN OPERATION
Last but not least, it is necessary to clarify the relationship
between jus post bellum,jus ad bellum, and jus in bello.
Here again, it is clear that the classical conceptions of just war
theory cannot simply be transposed to a modem legal setting.142 Just
war theorists and international lawyers may agree with the general
proposition that the idea of peacemaking after war is, to some extent,
rooted in jus ad bellum. 143 However, both disciplines tend to have
different point of departures concerning the application of the
principle of distinction. 144
Philosophers have challenged the independence of the (moral)
principles of jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 145 The basic assumption
of the principle of distinction, namely that the justification of the
recourse to force has no bearing on rights and obligations of
combatants in war, has been questioned from a moral point of
view. 146 It has been argued that, as a matter of morality, it is "simply
not... permissible to fight in a war with an unjust cause" since "acts
of war that promote an unjust cause cannot be proportionate" and
discriminate in terms of the harm that they inflict. 147 The same claim
has been made with respect to jus post bellum. It has been argued
that the "[f]ailure to meetjus ad bellum results in automatic failure to
meetjus in bello andjus post bellum" and that from a moral point of
view "any serious defection, by any participant, from these principles
of just war settlement should be seen as a violation of the rules of
just war termination, and so should be punished." 148 Or, as Orend put
142. Stahn, supra note 2, at 936.
143. Id. at 926.
144. See Jeff McMahan, Morality, Law and the Relation between Jus ad bellum
and Jus in Bello, 100 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 112, 112 (2006) (challenging that
the principle of distinction-the traditional separation between jus ad bellum and
jus in bellum-means that all combatants are morally equal in war).
145. See id. (arguing that there must be "substantial divergence" between the
"morality of war and the law of war").
146. Id. at 112-13.
147. Id. at 113.
148. OREND, MORALITY OF WAR, supra note 3, at 181.
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it more bluntly: "Once you're an aggressor in war, everything is lost
to you, morally."'49
Such an approach stands in opposition to the traditional stance of
international lawyers who have fought for recognition of the
principle of distinction over the past century. 50 The general
separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello became common ground
in international law in the second half of the twentieth century.' It is
inter alia reflected in the separate codification of aggression and war
crimes in the statutory instruments of international criminal
tribunals'52 and the Preamble to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions which clarifies that the provisions of the Protocol apply
in all circumstances without distinction based on the "nature or
origin" of the underlying conflict.'53 This principle is designed to
absolve compliance with the law from disputes over the causes of
armed conflict and meant to enhance protection for victims of
violence.
International lawyers would naturally plea for an extension of the
principle of distinction tojus post bellum. This separation comes into
play in the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus post bellum.
Obligations under jus post bellum would apply in an objective
149. Id.
150. See generally Antoine Bouvier, Assessing the Relationship between Jus in
Bello and Jus ad Bellum: An "Orthodox View," 100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
109, 110-12 (tracing the historical development of the principle of distinction and
concluding that no alternative system is available in the rules of international law).
151. Id. at 110. The author contrasts the parallel developments of jus ad bello
and jus in bello, noting that the former shrank to the two justifications for war
embodied in the U.N. Charter, while the latter grew into the web of conventional
and customary rules governing warfare itself. Id.
152. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 102, art. 5
(addressing war crimes and the crime of aggression separately); Agreement by the
Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (distinguishing between
"crimes against peace," defined as "planning, preparation, initiation or waging a
war of aggression," and "war crimes," defined as "violations of the laws or
customs of war").
153. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
Preamble, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
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fashion: All sides are under an obligation to settle disputes in a fair
and just fashion after the conflict, irrespective of the cause and
legality of the original use of force. A similar consideration governs
the relationship between jus post bellum and jus in bello. The jus
post bellum must 6 priori be independent from compliance with jus
in bello. If a party violates its obligations under jus in bello, it does
not lose its entitlement to a fair treatment under jus post bellum.
Some of the very concepts ofjus post bellum are designed to remedy
previous violations of jus ad bellum or jus in bello-state
responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, compensation,
etc. 1
54
The starting point of the legal discipline (the neutral application of
jus in bello) is thus different from just war theory.
Nevertheless, even under contemporary international law, the
separation ofjus ad bellum andjus in bello is not an absolute rule.'55
There is a certain convergence in the objectives ofjus ad bellum and
jus in bello. 56 Both branches of law ultimately pursue a common
rationale, namely to make war a less "viable option" in international
relations. 57 Moreover, the scope of application of the principle of
distinction itself is limited.
In some cases, it does not make sense at all to argue in terms of the
principle of distinction. The operation of the classical principle of
distinction is based on the assumption of the identity of parties to a
conflict under jus ad bellum and jus in bello.58 Modem armed
violence, however, is more complex. In the case of authorized
collective security operations, it is doubtful whether there are two
154. Stahn, supra note 2, at 936.
155. See Bouvier, supra note 150, at 111 (noting that the distinction betweenjus
ad bellum andjus in bello has been challenged in the last twenty-five years). The
challenges have rested on at least five grounds including "humanitarian
intervention," "collective security operations," "asymmetric conflicts," the "war on
terror," and the "possible subordination of jus in bello tojus ad bellum." Id.
156. See Mgret, supra note 81, at 121-23 (acknowledging that the two may
"operate more on a continuum than as parallel tracks").
157. See id. at 123 (suggesting that in addition to making war a less viable
option, 'jus ad bellum andjus in bello are converging towards making war either
illegal or... onerous legally").
158. See id. at 121 (noting that, according to jus in bello, "[w]hat makes war
war" is that "it is conducted by the sovereign").
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parties in the classical sense of jus in bello in the first place. 159
Moreover, in many cases, Kosovo and Iraq for example, the actors
involved on the post-conflict phase (U.N. civilian presences) are
different from those who carried out armed force (NATO, a coalition
of states). Such actors should equally come within the ambit of the
operation of jus post bellum even though they have not been parties
to armed force. 60
Most importantly, just as jus ad bellum and jus in bello are not
fully independent, jus ad bellum and jus post bellum cannot be
entirely independent of each other.' 61 The application and
interpretation of norms under one body of law may be informed by
findings under the other. Jus in bello, for instance, contains a built-in
reference to jus ad bellum in the definition of armed conflict in
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, which extends the applicability
of the law governing international armed conflicts to "armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self-determination.' 62 A similar nexus exists between
jus ad bellum and jus post bellum. The scope of legal obligations
under jus post bellum may depend on whether or not an intervention
was lawful.'63 For example, a very different set of obligations may
result in terms of reparation and individual criminal responsibility if
armed force was used in aggressive war or in self-defense. 64 Even in
the legal discipline, jus post bellum is thus not an entirely
autonomous branch of law.
159. See The Secretary-General, Secretary General's Bulletin: Observance by
United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, § 1, delivered to the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) (extending the
applicability of "fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian
law" to U.N. forces engaged in "enforcement operations, or in peacekeeping
operations" despite the fact that the U.N. is not a sovereign).
160. Id.
161. See Bouvier, supra note 150, at 109; Mgret, supra note 81, at 121.
162. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 153, art. 1(4).
163. See, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, supra note 42.
164. See id. at 61-63 (presenting the current conflict in Iraq as an example of
armed force used in an aggressive war, and expressing the sentiment of some of
the international community that, as a result, the United States is solely responsible
for "its aftermath... [and] attendant burdens").
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CONCLUSION
The concept of jus post bellum has gained new attention in
contemporary scholarship. But its current theorization is still
unsatisfactory in several respects. The concept is praised as a
promising instrument to enhance the sustainability of peace after
conflict, but it is often presented in a one-sided fashion and defined
without consideration of related disciplines. This vision should be
revisited. At least two factors require further attention.
The first is the general lack of attention to the legal dimensions of
jus post bellum. The concept itself emerged in the tradition of just
war theory, but it has been widely ignored in the legal discipline.
This gap may be explained by some structural grounds that are
rooted in the development of international law in the twentieth
century, but it is increasingly open to challenge from a normative
point of view. The exclusive reference to moral obligations in the
theorization of transitions from conflict to peace fails to recognize
the existing net of legal rules and principles in this area.
Contemporary developments suggest that it is time to take the
concept ofjus post bellum seriously as a legal paradigm, both in the
context of just war theory and within the legal community.
Second, there is a certain tendency in contemporary scholarship to
conflate or misconstrue the mutual roles of law and morality. The
fact that a legal jus post bellum may be traced back to a historical
tradition does not mean that the classical moral and the legal
paradigm must be identical. Moral theory and legal science share
distinct origins and rationales and approach the relationship between
jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum from different angles.
Moral philosophy is primarily concerned with the moral justification
of warfare, under which the operation of the principles of jus ad
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum is closely connected to the
overall cause, just or unjust, of the recourse to force. Jus post bellum
serves primarily as a benchmark to evaluate the legitimacy and
ethical implications of interventions. International lawyers, by
contrast, tend to view each of these categories as autonomous rules
of behavior, with the aim of maximizing compliance and respect for
human dignity. It is therefore not contradictory to construe jus post
bellum differently in each discipline.
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Nevertheless, the conceptual development of jus post bellum
requires more inter-disciplinary discourse. Scholars from different
communities would benefit from a closer look at related disciplines.
Some of the current (mis)perceptions of the role of moral parameters
in the theorization of jus post bellurn might be adjusted if just war
theorists paid greater attention to the impact of legal rules and
principles. Conversely, the legal discipline may draw valuable
insights from the content of the classical jus post bellum under just
war doctrine and historical sources when defining the contours ofjus
post bellum in modem international law.
